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RECENT DECISIONS
to have made the oral agreement is no longer able to make a denial.5
In the present case, the court dismissed the complaint for to do
otherwise would be to frustrate the above intention of the legislature.
It was further intended by the legislature that this provision was to
cover agreements made to take effect at or after death, 6 and inasmuch
as in this case the alleged agreement could not be completed until
the promisor's death, it was void. This is directly in line with the
majority of decisions in New York. In a recent case 7 in point, it
was held that an oral agreement by an employee irrevocably designat-
ing plaintiff sole beneficiary of employee's interest at his death in
New York City Retirement Fund was void under this same provision
of the Statute of Frauds.
The intention of the legislature in passing a statute of frauds
and this amendment has always been to prevent fraud. Consequently
if the court had upheld the claim, the evils against which the statute
was aimed would continue. There still would be possible the type
of litigation which is based upon alleged oral promises of persons no
longer able to make denials. There still would be the opportunity
for exactions from deceaseds' estates because the representatives of
the estates were unable to meet the allegations of claimant or felt
compelled in a spirit of caution to make settlement of "strike" claims
rather than risk heavier loss on unjustifiable claims which might
deceive a court or jury.
G.R.
DOMEsTIc RELATIONS-DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS.-New
York courts, in two decisions recently handed down, have shown
themselves to be stringent enforcers of the "clean hands" maxim. In
the case of Cole v. Cole, a decree of annulment was granted the re-
spondent on the ground that he was induced into marriage with the
appellant by her false and fraudulent statements that she was "with
child". The appellant, an employee in the home of the respondent's
parents, had been indulging in illicit relations with the respondent
for many months when she began to evidence signs of what she
claimed to be pregnancy. A physician, called on the respondent's
behalf at the trial, testified that he was visited by the appellant prior
to the marriage and the symptoms she evidenced would indicate preg-
nancy to a layman. Under pressure from the appellant, and realizing
that if she were pregnant, he was the father, respondent married her.
Some time after the marriage, while she and the respondent were
riding in an automobile, the appellant confided to him information to
the effect that she had intentionally misrepresented her condition in
5 Matter of Quigley's Estate, 179 Misc. 210, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 330 (1942).
6 In re Ditson's Estate, 177 Misc. 648, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 468 (1941).
7 Bayreuther v. Reinish, 264 App. Div. 138, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 674, aff'd,
290 N. Y. 553 (1942).
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order to get' him to marry her. Secreted in the back of the car was
respondent's mother and it was her testimony coupled with his that
established the fraud to the satisfaction of the court. An appeal was
taken by the wife to the Supreme Court. Held, judgment reversed.
"If the appellant is to be condemned for her unconventional con-
duct, the respondent is likewise. He does not come into a court of
equity with clean hands, and may not have relief in this ecclesiastical
branch of the Supreme Court. Pregnancy might naturally be ex-
pected from his conduct with the appellant, and as a matter of law,
he is not entitlec to a decree dissolving the contract into which he
entered." Also it might be reasonably inferred that the representa-
tions of the appellant were made in good faith. The testimony of
the physician, to an extent, corroborated her, whereas the respon-
dent's mother might be considered an "interested" witness. There-
fore, the burden of proof cast upon the respondent seemed not to be
adequately met. Cole v. Cole, 100 App. Div. 296 (3d Dep't 1944).
Similarly, in the second case in point, the plaintiff was denied
the relief sought on the same equitable ground. There, the plaintiff
assisted the defendant in procuring a divorce from her former hus-
band for ulterior reasons relating to the Selective Service Act.' He
married her, although fully aware that her interlocutory decree of
divorce 2 had not yet become final. In an annulment action brought
by the plaintiff, the court gave judgment for the defendant. Held,
affirmed. "The 'clean hands' maxim requires that he who has done
inequity in respect to the subject matter of an action may not have
equity as a matter of the affirmative exercise of the power by a court
of equity." Lodati v. Lodati, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 119 (1944).
Surveying the decisions of the Cole and Lodati cases, their com-
mon basis becomes apparent. While it is true that upon the facts of
the Cole case, the conclusion might be reached that no fraud existed,
the main ground upon which the case was decided was upon the
theory, "He who seeks equity must do equity." The Lodati case, on
the other hand, embodied a definite and sole reliance upon the "dean
hands" maxim. For there, the second marriage of the defendant
under the facts presented would seem to have been an absolute nullity,
yet because the plaintiff had so fraudulently colluded in the creation
of the wrongful status, he was estopped from denying its validity.
The equitable doctrine adhered to in the cases at bar is neither a very
new nor a very radical one. Courts of equity being "tribunals of
good conscience", have insisted on the utmost good faith of their
I SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE AcT, 50 U. S .C. A. appendix 8, 301
et seq. (1940).
2 In those jurisdictions where under the statutes an interlocutory judgment
or decree ni is granted, the marriage relation is not terminated until the entry
of the final decree, and, therefore, prior to the entry of the final judgment or
decree, the parties have no right to remarry. 9 R. C. L. 503.
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litigants, and where the plaintiff has assisted,3 encouraged or acqui-
esced t in the wrong of the defendant, the weight of judicial authority
in most of the states has been to deny the relief petitioned for. The
case of Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo r was relied upon by the plaintiff
to sustain the decree in the Cole case. But regarding the Di Lorenzo
decision the court said: "It is not an authority under the facts here
pesented." 6 In 1893 the New York court refused relief under cir-
cumstances very similar to those of the Cole case.7 While the Gordon
case,8 decided in 1929, embodied a contrary view, the leading case of
Donovan v. Donovan 9 subsequently re-established the law that under
the doctrine of "unclean hands", the fact that a woman not pregnant
induced a man to marry her by misrepresenting that she was preg-
nant, did not warrant an annulment action brought by him, a party
to the illicit relations. The result reached in the Lodati case is like-
wise in- line with this established rule of "good conscience".
Marriage "is an institution in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested." 10 It is because of this neces-
sary significance which society attaches to it that the marriage con-
tract is taken out of the realm of the ordinary contract. Therefore,
in passing upon the laws regarding marriage, the courts must do so
with the broad outlook of the public good in mind. The marriage
contract in each of the cases at bar had its inception in wrongful
conduct. Conduct participated in equally by the plaintiff and the
defendant, and while each marriage "might be termed a failure from
the time of its ceremonial, the result may be imputed to its ... origin
rather than to any imperfection in the institution itself." 11 The func-
tion of the court, therefore, should be to discourage the conduct re-
sulting in such marriage. This may be best accomplished not by
invalidating the status created by the wrongdoing, but by imposing
upon the wrongdoer the penalty of abiding by the contract he created.
The Cole and Lodati cases are in line with this view.
P. K. W.
3 Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1917).
"The public policy of this state not to recognize a divorce decree of a sister
state obtained upon constructive service will not be invoked to annul a marriage
for the benefit of one who aided the wife in obtaining a divorce in another
state and subsequently married her."
4 Heller v. Heller, 259 App. Div. 852, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 509 (1940).
5 Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467 (1903).
6 In the Di Lorenzo case, cited supra note 5, a woman produced an infant,
displaying it to the man and falsely stating it was their child.
7 Tait v. Tait, 3 Misc. 218, 23 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1893).
8 Gordon v. Gordon, 225 App. Div. 822, 232 N. Y. Supp. 541 (2d Dep't),
resettled, 233 N. Y. Supp. 770 (1929). Decree was granted in an action for
annulment based on the false representations of the defendant as to pregnancy.
9 Donovan v. Donovan, 147 Misc. 134, 263 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1933).
10 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. ed. 654 (1888).
11 Tait v. Tait, cited supra note 7.
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